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Introduction 
 
 
The purpose of the present paper is fairly straightforward. We want to show that 
institutional reforms, such as the adoption of a conduct code, represent a necessary albeit 
insufficient condition to curb corruption and promote good governance. As several 
scholars have pointed out the success of institutional reform in general and the success of 
codes of conduct in particular depends, among other things, on ideational conditions. 
With regard to codes of conduct, parliamentary ethics experts believe in fact that the 
success of a code of conduct depends on whether the individuals who are supposed to be 
regulated by the disposition of the code, have a common understanding of what are the 
problems that the code is supposed to address or of how the code can solve those 
problems. In other words, it is argued that the success of codes of conduct for 
Parliamentarians requires homogenous ethical standards and expectations. On the basis of 
a survey conducted among the members of the ethics council of the Indonesian DPD and 
DPR, we show that values and preferences of Indonesian MPs are far from being 
homogenous. Hence, we suggest that in order to make conduct codes successful in 
Indonesia, it is necessary to homogenize the ethical standards, values and expectations of 
Indonesian parliamentarians. 
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In the course of the paper we proceed as follows. In the first part of the paper, we 
summarize how the institutional approach to the study of politics has evolved over the 
years. Specifically we note that in contrast to classical institutionalist arguments, for 
which political outcomes were somewhat mechanistically determined by institutional 
arrangements, neo-institutional arguments underline that the relationship between 
institutions and political outcome is conditional as it depends on a variety of conditions 
such as actors’ constellation, political will or ideas. Building on this ideational variant of 
neo-institutionalist arguments, we go on to say that ideational conditions are important  
for the success of conduct codes. In fact, as the literature has repeatedly observed, the 
success of conduct codes depends more on whether MPs have homogenous values, 
preferences and expectations than on whether the code establish severe sanctions. 
 In the second part of the paper, we discuss the Indonesian case. In doing so, we 
show that in spite of the Indonesian transition to democracy, Indonesia’s democracy is 
not characterized by particularly high levels of good governance. On the basis of survey 
data collected by Transparency International and the World Value Survey we show that 
the Indonesian political system is perceived to be very corrupt and that Indonesian 
citizens have very little trust in Indonesian institutions. We use this evidence to explain 
why the DPR and the DPD have taken some steps, such as the adoption of ethics code, 
and are willing to take some more steps, such as the adoption of a conduct code, to curb 
corruption. We conclude this part of the paper by arguing that while enacting ethics 
reforms is necessary, it may not be sufficient to promote good governance. If ideational 
institutionalists are correct in saying that the success of conduct codes depends on 
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whether the ethical standards are homogenous (or not), then we need to know whether 
this condition is satisfied (or not) in the Indonesian case. 
In the third part of the paper we present the results of a survey conducted among 
the members of the ethics council of the DPD and the DPR. The data analysis reveals that 
there is a plurality of ethical standards among Indonesian parliamentarians and this may 
represent an obstacle for the success of the ethics reforms. 
In the conclusions, we suggest that in order to make ethics reforms succeed in 
addition to adopting codes of conduct and similar institutional arrangements, it is also 
necessary to homogenize the ethical standards and expectations of the Indonesian 
parliamentarians. 
 
Part I. Institutionalisms 
 
 
Long neglected in political science literature, institutions have received a considerable 
amount of attention in the course of the past two decades. Rational choice scholars 
(Tsebelis, 2003) view institutions as those mechanisms that translate individual 
preferences (micro) into social equilibria (macro). Historical institutionalists (Steinmo et 
alii, 1993) believe instead that institutions are not simply mechanisms for translating 
individual preferences into social equilibria, but believe instead that institutions actually 
contribute to the formation of individual preferences. The single most important factor 
that contributed to the rediscovery of political institutions in general and of 
constitutions/constitutional mechanisms in particular was the so called third wave of 
democratization (Huntington, 1991). This wave confronted the political science 
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community with a basic question, namely what institutional/constitutional arrangements 
are more likely to create the conditions for democratic consolidation? What institutional 
and constitutional choices should be made to make these newly established democratic 
regimes survive? In part because constitutions had to be written and institutions had to be 
set up, in part because without institutions scholars working in the rational tradition did 
not know how to explain equilibria and in part because institutions were seen as 
constitutive elements of individual preferences, the past two decades have witnessed a 
new, and growing interest in the study of political institutions. This has led to a 
refinement of institutional arguments and analyses and to a pluralization/proliferation of 
institutional approaches. Scholars have for example recognized that while political 
outcomes are shaped by political institutions, institutions do not exist and operate in a 
vacuum. Institutions function in a space which is populated by political actors, who have 
specific ideas and values. Hence, new generations of studies in the neo-institutional 
framework have emphasized the importance of actor constellations and/or ideas in 
understanding institutional performance and change. In the first respect, neo-
institutionalists have argued that the impact of institutions on political outcomes is 
conditional, which means that whether institutional potential of producing a specific 
outcome is translated into effect or not depends on actor constellations. In the second 
respect scholars working in this neo-institutionalist framework have investigated the 
conditions under which institutional change occurs. In doing so, several scholars have 
pointed out that the choice of institutions is often the result of an ideational struggle 
(Blyth, 2002). 
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Ideas are not only important in explaining how institutions are chosen but also 
whether and how institutions actually function. The case of ethics reforms is actually a 
good case in point. Early studies were actually inscribed in classical institutionalist 
framework, which postulates, somewhat mechanistically, that institutions shape actors 
behavior. With regard to the success of ethics reforms and codes of conduct, this classical 
institutionalist argument suggested that the adoption of conduct codes could contribute to 
curbing corruption and other forms of misconduct because it established some more or 
less severe sanctions for violations of the dispositions of the code. Hence, in this case, the 
classical institutionalist argument took the following form: 
 
Conduct codeÆsanctionsÆmore ethical conduct 
 
 
The work by Willa Bruce (1996) has shown instead that there is very little 
evidence supporting this classical institutionalist argument. First of all there is very little 
evidence showing whether the adoption of a conduct code actually leads to a more ethical 
behavior of the actors that the code is intended to regulate. Bruce showed, and this is our 
second point, that the adoption of the code is related to lower levels of perceived 
corruption and misconduct. 
Studies on ethics reforms and on the conditions that make ethics reforms 
successful, have provided more support for ideational or cultural institutionalist 
arguments than for classical institutionalist arguments. Snape (2001) argued that 
ineffectiveness of scrutiny often depends on the fact that there are different and 
conflicting interpretations of what scrutiny should or should not be. Morgan (2005) 
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stressed conduct codes cannot be successfully adopted without paying proper attention to 
the political culture of the individuals whom the code is supposed to regulate. Bruce 
(2000) suggested that ethical behavior is affected by whether individuals are 
religious/spiritual. If her argument could be extended to codes of conduct, one could 
argue that compliance with the dispositions of a conduct code (and therefore the success 
of the code itself) are significantly affected by whether the individuals regulated by the 
code are religious/spiritual. These studies are fairly interesting for our present purposes. 
In fact, in spite of the fact that the cultural factor is associated with respectively 
interpretation, political culture or religiosity/spirituality, all these studies posit a link 
between cultural conditions and institutional success (the success of the code in curbing 
corruption and promoting good governance). This linkage was most forcefully suggested 
in a study by Skelcher and Snape (2001). These scholars argued in fact that the success of 
a conduct code requires the following cultural conditions: 1) the individuals to whom the 
code is applied must have the same attitudes and values; 2) they must have a shared 
understanding of what are the problems that the code is supposed to prevent and possibly 
eliminate; 3) they must have a shared understanding of what the solutions for those 
problems may be. 
If these scholars are correct in positing a linkage between cultural and ideational 
factors on the one hand institutional success on the other hand, what are the implications 
for the Indonesian case? This is what we are going to discuss in the remainder of the 
paper.  
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Part Two: Indonesia and its political context 
 
 
After gaining independence in 1949, Indonesia failed to establish a lasting democratic 
regime.1 Although in the early 1950s there was an initial momentum toward democratic 
governance, authoritarian dynamics gradually prevailed over the fragile and young 
Indonesian democracy, so that by the late 1950s Indonesian had become an authoritarian 
regime under its first President Sukarno.  The “non democratic, New Order regime” was 
further consolidated under President Suharto in the mid-1960s.  Having eliminated 
former President Sukarno and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), Suharto 
engineered the creation of Golkar, a pro-government political party formed based on 
bureaucratic and military interests. During his 32 years in power, Suharto created a 
patrimonial political system that rewarded his supporters, including family and friends, 
punishing his opponents and the public at large by placing restrictions on civil liberties 
where elections were held every 5 years. Indeed, scholars such as MacIntyre2 have 
argued that the government had the authority to vet all political candidates standing for 
elections, pressuring legislators to be very reluctant in exercising their right to amend or 
block bills in parliament. Furthermore, keeping in mind the heavy bias towards the 
executive, military officers were able to occupy up to 20% of the seats in parliament 
(MacIntyre, 2001). 
                                                 
1 The Indonesian case is not exceptional in this regard. As Huntington (1991) many of the countries that 
democratized in the course of the second wave of democratization were unable to consolidate democracy, 
suffered democratic breakdowns contributing to what Huntington defined as ‘second reverse wave’. 
2 Andrew MacIntyre, Investment Property Rights and Corruption in Indonesia Ateneo University Press, 
Manila, 2001. [http://apseg.anu.edu.au/pdf/macintyre_papers/Investme.pdf] 
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Given all this, it is not surprising that the Freedom House Index labels Indonesia 
as a “Partially Free” democratic country for the 1972-1993 period. Indonesia was 
categorized as a “Non Free” country in the years 1994-1998, when the country was hit by 
the Asian Financial Crisis.3 Indonesia plunged into political and economic turmoil as 
civil society realized the severity of corruption, collusion and nepotism that were 
plaguing political institutions. Subsequently, Indonesia recovered its “Partially Free” 
status in the 1998-2005 period. In fact, the quality of democracy in Indonesia has been 
improving in the post Suharto era: Indonesia received at 3.5 score on the Gastil Index of 
Freedom in the 2001-2005 period. This represents a vast improvement in the quality of 
democracy: from 1974 to 1985 Indonesian democracy (or the lack thereof) never received 
a score lower than 5 on the Gastil Index of Freedom.  
 
Indonesia and Political Corruption 
 
 
Despite increasing political and economic stability in Indonesia, corruption (as well as 
other forms of misconduct) remains the most serious problem in post-Suharto  Indonesian 
politics. Research by Transparency International, a leading global coalition against 
corruption, sustains this claim. Transparency International computes on a yearly basis the 
                                                 
3 Freedom House computes an annual index of freedom for all the countries in the world. This index is 
computed in the following way. The Freedom House assigns to each country a political rights and a civil 
rights score. Both scores are 7-point scales. The Gastil index is measured by adding the political rights 
score to the civil rights score and by dividing their sum by two. This means that if a country has a political 
rights score of 3 and a civil rights score of 4, the freedom score for this country is (3+4)/2=3.5. Countries 
that score from 1 to 2.5 points on this scale are considered free; countries scoring from 3 to 5.5 are 
considered as partially free and countries with a score of 5.5 or higher belong to the group of non-free 
countries. 
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“Corruption Perception Index” (CPI henceforth) which measures the level of corruption 
perceived in a given country by businessmen and country analysts.4  
Table 1. Indonesia's CPI Performance (in 10 years) 
Year Corruption Index Individual Rank 
Total No of 
Countries Percentile 
2005 2.20 137 159 86.16% 
2004 2.00 133 146 91.10% 
2003 1.90 122 133 91.73% 
2002 1.90 96 102 94.12% 
2001 1.90 88 91 96.70% 
2000 1.70 85 90 94.44% 
1999 1.70 96 99 96.97% 
1998 2.00 80 85 94.12% 
1997 2.70 46 52 88.46% 
1996 2.65 45 54 83.33% 
1995 1.94 41 41 100.00% 
Source: Transparency International, 1995-2005. 
 
The data collected by Transparency International are presented in table 1. The data reveal 
that Indonesia is consistently perceived to be a very corrupt society. In fact, the CPI for 
Indonesia has never been higher than 3. A simple comparison allows us to understand 
what it means having such a low score. Regardless of the number of countries being 
sampled worldwide, Indonesia has always ranked among the most corrupt societies in the 
world. Leaving aside 1995 when Indonesia was perceived to be the single most corrupt of 
the 41 polities for which data had been collected, Indonesia is consistently viewed as a 
more corrupt than most societies. In seven years out of ten in the 1996-2005 period 
Indonesia was at least in the 90th percentile while in the other three years it was at least in 
the 80th. This means that in the years in which Indonesia was perceived to do better in 
comparative term, it was still regarded as more corrupt than 80 percent of the countries 
                                                 
4 The CPI is measured on a 10-point scale between where 0 indicates highly corrupt and where 10 indicates 
instead highly clean, see [http://ww1.transparency.org/]. 
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for which Transparency International was collecting data. In the years in which Indonesia 
was perceived to do worse in comparative terms, Indonesia was perceived to more 
corrupt than 90 percent of the countries covered by Transparency International. Of course 
one should keep in mind that the CPI estimated by Transparency International does not 
really measure objective corruption, it provides an indication of how much corruption is 
perceived to exist in a country and as such they do not provide the best possible ground 
for making cross-country comparisons. Yet, these data all point in the same direction, 
namely that Indonesia is perceived to be very corrupt, that corruption represents a major 
problem in Indonesian politics in and by itself, and that corruption may be problematic as 
it is associated with falling levels of trust.5 In sum, corruption is perceived to be a serious 
problem in Indonesia and this is why it is so important to take some steps to curb and 
possibly eliminate corruption (along with other forms of misconduct). 
Transparency International developed another important tool (the Corruption 
Barometer) to assess the severity of corruption within institutions and its impact on the 
level of trust citizens have in these institutions.6 The list of institutions includes 
parliaments, political parties, the military and judiciary. In 36 out of 62 countries 
surveyed, political parties were rated by the general public as the institution most affected 
by corruption; but Indonesia’s civil society sentiments differed from this findings.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 We will elaborate this point in greater detail later on in the paper. 
6 Respondents were asked to rank on a five point scale the extent to which they perceived various 
institutional sectors to be affected by corruption. 
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Table 2. to what extent do you perceive this institution to be affected by corruption? 
Institutions Perception of Corruption 
Political Parties 4.4 
Parliament/ Legislature 4.4 
Legal system/ Judiciary 4.2 
Police 4.2 
Business/ private sector 3.7 
Tax revenue 4 
Customs 4.3 
Media 2.6 
Medical services 3 
Education system 3.2 
Registry and permit services 3.7 
Utilities 3.1 
Military 3.3 
NGOs 2.4 
Religious bodies 1.8 
Source: Transparency International, 1995-2005. Note: scale 1 (not at all corrupt) to 5 (extremely corrupt). 
 
According to the Corruption Barometer 2004, respondents in Indonesia rated their 
parliaments and legislatures to be the most corrupt institution (along with, of course, 
political parties).  
Indonesia institutions are perceived to be highly corrupt and, not surprisingly,  
enjoy low levels of trust. The fourth wave of the World Values Survey conducted in 
1998-2001 revealed that Indonesians generally have very little confidence in all types of 
national institutions. Data are presented in Table 3.7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 World Values Survey contains the work of social scientists worldwide who desire to produce evidence 
that there are gradual but pervasive changes occurring in each country’s society that its citizens want out of 
life. There have been four waves of survey analysis, and Indonesia was only sampled on the fourth wave in 
2001. [http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/organization/index.html] 
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Table 3. World Values Survey: Indonesia's level of confidence in different institutions and organizations 
Organization/Institution A Great Deal Quite a lot Not very much Not at all 
Churches 75 21.7 2.8 0.4 
Armed Forces 16.6 57.3 24.1 1.9 
The Press 5.8 49.1 42.7 2.4 
Labour Unions 4.5 33.4 55.3 6.8 
The Police 9 43 43.4 4.6 
Parliament 3.2 39.8 49.6 7.4 
The Civil Services 8.5 50.9 36.9 3.7 
Television 9.1 52.2 36.8 1.9 
The Government 9.4 43 42.9 4.8 
The Political Parties 3.9 29.2 57 9.9 
Major Companies 6.3 40.7 47.2 5.9 
The environmental 
protection movement 9.9 44.9 40.4 4.7 
The Women's Movement 6.8 43.9 42.6 6.8 
UN 10.3 37.7 40.7 11.3 
ASEAN 9 44 39.6 7.3 
Source: Source: World Values Survey, 1981-2004 (Country: Indonesia, 2001). Note: Rank Scale (1: A 
great deal, 4:Not at all). 
 
About a thousand respondents were interviewed in Indonesia by the World Value Survey. 
Respondents were asked to express on a 4 point scale - from 1 (great deal of confidence) 
to 4 (none at all)- how much confidence they had in 15 private, public and regional 
institutions. Since Indonesia was slowly recovering from the Asian Financial Crisis and 
was struggling to consolidate its new form of “democracy” after the Suharto years in 
2001, it comes as no surprise that the Indonesian respondents were still wary of such 
large institutions that were still regarded as both inefficient and corrupt. To sum up, what 
we have said so far suggests three basic conclusions, namely that : 
1) Indonesia has consistently been perceived to be highly corrupt and to be one of 
the most corrupt countries in the world; 
2) The parliament (along with parties) is perceived to be the most corrupt institution 
in Indonesia; and 
3) The Parliament is one of the three least trusted institutions in Indonesia. 
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One solution to regain citizens’ trust consists in enacting ethics reforms and creating 
ethics regime. This means that a political system which is (or is at least perceived to be) 
corrupt implements some institutional reforms to reduce corruption and regain the trust of 
the citizens. This is why ethics reforms and the creation of ethics regimes are said to 
perform both an internal as well as an external function.8  
The creation of ethics regimes, as discussed in the scholarly literature, can occur 
by either adopting ethics codes, or by adopting conduct codes.9 Ethics codes state what 
are the main ethical values and principles of an organization, but they have no bite. By 
contrast, conduct codes are remarkably more specific. They clearly indicate which forms 
of conduct represents acceptable conduct and they also indicate which types of conduct 
are to be regarded as improper. Moreover, codes of conduct differ from ethics codes in a 
second respect: codes of conduct establish sanctions for punishing violations of the 
provisions of the code.  
 Given the persistently high levels of perceived corruption and the low levels of 
trust in institution, the Indonesian legislature was forced to take some steps in order to 
curb corruption, to show its commitment to the principles and the values of good 
governance and to regain the trust of its citizens. The Indonesian parliament tried to do so 
by enacting some ethics reforms. The DPR (lower house) adopted a code of ethics on 
September 29, 2004 and it is considering whether and to what extent it would be 
advisable to couple the adoption of the ethics code with the adoption of a conduct code. 
                                                 
8 Rick Stapenhurst and Riccardo Pelizzo, “Legislative Ethics and Codes of Conduct”, WBI Working Paper, 
Series in Contemporary Parliamentary Development, Washington DC, 2004, p. 5. A revised version of this 
paper can be found in Rick Stapenhurst, Niall Johnston and Riccardo Pelizzo (eds.), The Role of 
Parliaments in Curbing Corruption, Washington DC, The World Bank, 2006, pp. 195-203. 
9 Gianfranco Pasquino and Riccardo Pelizzo, Parlamenti Democratici, Bologna, il Mulino, 2006, ch. 6. 
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The DPD has already taken a more entrepreneurial approach with regard to the adoption 
of a conduct code. In fact, in spite of the fact that the ethics council of the DPD does not 
have the constitutional mandate to draft legislation, the ethics council has already 
prepared a draft of a code of conduct to manifest its commitment to ethics reforms and 
good governance. 
While the steps taken by the ethics council of the DPD and the DPR are 
encouraging as they show these institutions’ commitment to adopting a code of conduct, 
improving governance and fighting corruption, it is worth keeping in mind that the 
process of institutional reform is not an easy one. In discussing which dispositions should 
be included in the code of conduct the members of the ethics council of both the DPD 
and the DPR have manifested some skepticism as to the adoption of rules forcing 
members to either disclose or register their interests. In addition to this one should note 
that the members of the ethics council of DPD who are mostly businesspeople or 
entrepreneurs of some sort, strongly oppose the adoption of regulations that may force 
them to give up their job in the private sector while they serve their term in office. 
Personal conversations between one of the authors of this paper and the members of 
ethics council in the DPR and the DPD revealed that while members are in favor of 
adopting the code, they may oppose the adoption of gifts and travel restrictions that are 
key component of any code of conduct. Hence, we believe that the adoption of a code of 
conduct is confronted with the following conundrum: if the dispositions of the code are 
too stringent (no gift, disclosure of interests, job restrictions), members may oppose the 
adoption of such a code; conversely if the dispositions of the code have no bite, 
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regardless of how much support they may receive from MPs, they will not be able to 
significantly affect the ethical behavior of Indonesian legislators.  
Be that as it may, given the interest demonstrated both by the members of the 
DPD and the DPR in institutional reforms, ethics regimes and codes of conduct, we 
administered a survey to the members of the ethics council of the DPD and the DPR. We 
conducted this survey to assess whether and to what extent Indonesian MPs have 
homogenous ethical standards –which is what is required to make conduct codes succeed- 
or not. The results of our survey will be presented and discussed in the next part of the 
paper. 
 
Part Three: Analysis of Survey Data 
 
 
In order to examine sentiments towards corruption of the members of the DPD and the 
DPR we conducted a survey on “General Sentiments on Corruption”.10 In this survey we 
used a questionnaire that had originally been devised by Mancuso (1993; 1995) to 
investigate the ethical world of British MPs. We decided to use this questionnaire for two 
reasons. The first reason is that we believe that such a questionnaire allows the analyst to 
gain some insight into the ethical values and preferences of parliamentarians. The second 
reasons is that by adopting Mancuso’ s questionnaire, we are able to generate that may be 
used for cross-country comparisons which, we believe, may help shed some light into the 
                                                 
10 The survey of the member of the ethics council of the DPR was administered in the course of a workshop 
on parliamentary ethics and codes of conduct organized by the National Democratic Institute. The survey 
was administered to the members of the ethics council of the DPD by Indraneel Datta of IDEA. We wish to 
thank IDEA, NDI, Indraneel Datta and Tom Cormier for all their help and support. We wish to thank Rick 
Stapenhurst who made all this possible. 
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ethical standards of parliamentarians and into how these standards may determine the 
success or the failure of ethics reforms. 
Be that as it may, in this part of the survey (six questions), respondents were 
required to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement to each of the six 
statements, ranging on a 7 point scale from 1 (Strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree).  
Table 4. General Statements on Corruption 
 
Strongly 
Agree     Neutral     
Strongly 
disagree   
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 
Political Corruption 
a widespread 
problem 
40.7 7.4 7.4 22.2 7.4 7.4 7.4 3 
People don't trust 
politicians as they 
don't understand 
politics 
14.8 0.0 29.6 18.5 22.2 0.0 14.8 3.93 
Dishonesty more 
widespread in 
politics than in 
business 
40.7 14.8 11.1 14.8 7.4 7.4 3.7 2.7 
Corruption more 
widespread at local 
than national level 
14.8 0.0 0.0 33.3 14.8 22.2 14.8 4.59 
No matter what we 
do, corruption can 
never be eliminated 
18.5 0.0 7.4 18.5 0.0 18.5 37 4.85 
Corruption reflects 
standard of society 29.6 18.5 14.8 18.5 0.0 3.7 14.8 3.11 
 
 Indonesian parliamentarians believe that corruption can be eliminated, that is 
more widespread at the national than at the local level, that politicians are more corrupt 
than business people, that corruption reflects a society’s ethical standards, and that 
corruption is indeed a major problem in Indonesia. Given these answers one could note 
that if corruption is a problem that can be solved and if corruption reflects a society’s 
standards, then political elites in Indonesia in addition to implementing ethics reforms 
should also take some steps to educate the public and to modify/improve society’s ethical 
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preferences and values. But we need to make a second and more important remark, 
namely that the data analysis reveals that the ethical standards among the member of the 
ethics council in the DPD and in the DPR are not homogenous. Most of the respondents 
view political corruption as a widespread problem and agree dishonesty is more common 
in politics than in business, but the agreement on these issues is far from being 
unanimous.  
 The answers, as we mentioned earlier on in the paper, are given on a seven-point 
scale. Value 1 indicates strong agreement, value 7 indicates strong disagreement and 
value 4 indicates that a respondent is neutral about a given issue. To assess how much 
disagreement there is on the six issues on which respondents were asked to express their 
views, we proceed as follows. We discount all the answers in the neutral category, we 
add up all the answers indicating agreement (however strong), and we ad all the answers 
indicating disagreement (however strong). By doing so, we find that there is some 
disagreement on most issues and that on some issues disagreement is quite pervasive.   
About 55 percent of the respondents agree that political corruption is widespread, 
but more than 22 percent of them disagrees with that view. About 44 percent of the 
respondents agree that the reason why voters do not trust politicians is that they do not 
understand politics, but this view is opposed by 37 percent of the respondents. In other 
words, members of the ethics council in the DPD and in the DPR are almost evenly split 
on this issue. About 65 percent of the respondents agree that dishonesty is more 
widespread in politics than in business, but 18 percent of them actually disagrees. About 
70 percent of the respondents regard hiring the wife or a relative as personal secretary as 
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a corrupt action, while this behavior is regard as perfectly legitimate by more than 20 
percent of the respondents.11  
For more than 50 percent of the respondents corruption is more common at the 
national level, while almost 15 percent of the respondents holds the opposite view. 
Opinions differ also as to whether corruption can be eliminated. In fact, while 55.5 
percent of the respondents believe that corruption can be eliminated, about 26 percent of 
the respondents holds the opposite view. 
Table 5. Polarization of views on General Statements of Corruption 
 
Strongly 
Agree Neutral 
Strongly 
disagree  Polarization 
  1 4 7 [1+7]-4 
Political Corruption a widespread 
problem 
40.7 22.2 7.4 25.9 
People don't trust politicians as they 
don't understand politics 
14.8 18.5 14.8 11.1 
Dishonesty more widespread in 
politics than in business 
40.7 14.8 3.7 29.6 
Corruption more widespread at local 
than national level 
14.8 33.3 14.8 -3.7 
No matter what we do, corruption 
can never be eliminated 
18.5 18.5 37 37 
Corruption reflects standard of 
society 
29.6 18.5 14.8 25.9 
 
To further examine the opinions of the respondents, we calculated the degree of 
polarization possibly arising towards these six statements. Building upon the work of 
Sartori (1976), Pelizzo and Babones (2003) constructed the Pelizzo-Babones index of 
polarization. They defined polarization as the total spread of opinion suggested that 
polarization can be measured by the following formula: 
                                                 
11 As a point of comparison, one could observe that hiring relatives to serve as personal secretaries is a 
fairly common practice among Italian members of the European Parliament.  
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[(extreme left + extreme right) – centre] 
This definition of polarization can be used to assess the amount of disagreement on ethics 
issue within the Indonesian council of ethics. The Pelizzo-Babones index of polarization 
can be used in this paper by adding the percentage of the responses located at the two 
extremes of the scale and by subtracting the number of neutral responses from the total of 
extreme responses, that is: 
[{strongly agree + strongly disagree} – neutral] 
By applying this simple formula to the data presented in Table 4, we are able to establish 
the polarization of respondents’ views towards general statements of corruption as shown 
in Table 5. From these computations, we find that polarization of views among 
parliamentarians ranges from 11 to 37 percent for only five issues. The fourth scenario 
stating that “corruption is more widespread at local than national level” was proven to be 
one of the least contentious issues among respondents regarding this survey, with a score 
of -3.7percent on the polarization index. The highest level of polarization, and , therefore, 
the greatest amount of disagreement, was recorded on whether corruption can or cannot 
be eliminated. The second most contentious item was whether dishonesty is more 
common in politics or in business Respondents were equally polarized as to whether 
political corruption is  a widespread phenomenon and as to whether corruption reflects 
the ethical standards of a society. The polarization in each of these four scenarios was 
higher than 25 percent. These results suggest that the ethical attitudes and perspectives of 
Indonesian parliamentarians are far from homogenous. Without a homogenous set of 
ethical perspectives and values, it is very difficult to make conduct codes succeed in the 
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long term. In order to ensure such success, the ethical standards of Indonesian 
parliamentarians must be homogenized, reducing possible polarization of opinions on 
ethical issues.  
In order to properly assess how homogenous were the ethical standards of the 
Indonesian MPs, respondents were also provided with 10 corruption scenarios and were 
asked to rank each of these scenarios on a 7 point scale where 1 meant corrupt and 7 
meant non corrupt.  
Data analysis reveals that 8 of the 10 scenarios were considered as corrupt 
scenarios by the respondents, who however regarded accepting cigars from wealthy 
constituents and arranging meetings between MPs and businessmen as non-corrupt 
practices. 
The data analysis also reveals that there is a quite a bit of disagreement among 
MPs as to how various activities should be judged. For example, while about 40 percent 
of the respondents regarded arranging meeting between MPs and businessmen as corrupt, 
about 44 percent of the respondents considered this practice as non corrupt. Accepting 
cigars was viewed as a corrupt behavior by about 25 percent of the respondents, while it 
was treated as non corrupt by 44 percent of the respondents. Yet, these scenarios are not 
clear cut cases of corruption. What is truly surprising is the fact that for some MPs 
promising appointments in exchange for campaign contributions, using influence to get a 
friend a job, awarding a contract to a company which had made a major campaign 
contribution are not unanimously viewed as corrupt practices. For 16 percent of the 
respondents promising an appointment position in exchange of campaign contribution did 
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not represent a clear cut case of corruption. For 15 percent of the respondents using 
influence to get a friend a job does not represent a corrupt behavior. Even more 
surprisingly 3.7 of the respondents did not regard awarding a public contract to a 
company that had made major donations to party finance as a corrupt action. 
Table 6. Corruption Scenarios 
 Very 
corrupt 
  Neutral   No 
corrupt 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7    Mean 
Cabinet minister promises 
appointment position 
exchange for campaign 
contribution 
42.3 11.5 30.8 7.7 0.0 3.8 3.8 2.38 
MP using influence to get 
friend/relative admitted to 
prestigious institution 
40.7 22.2 18.5 11.1 3.7 3.7 0.0 2.26 
MP using influence to get 
friend/relative a job 33.3 22.2 29.6 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 2.48 
Cabinet minister use 
influence to obtain contract 
for firm in his constituency 
44.4 18.5 14.8 11.1 3.7 3.7 3.7 2.37 
MP arrange for meetings 
between private corporation 
executives and 
parliamentarians 
11.1 11.1 18.5 14.8 0.0 11.1 33.3 4.48 
MP hires wife or family 
member to serve as his 
secretary 
40.7 22.2 7.4 7.4 11.1 0.0 11.1 2.7 
MP accepts a box of cigars 
from influential constituent 7.4 11.1 7.4 29.6 3.7 11.1 29.6 4.63 
Major company makes big 
donation to government 
party, eventually won major 
contract 
70.4 22.2 3.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 1.52 
MP exchange 1st class 
ticket allocated for economy 
class, pockets the difference 
42.3 15.4 7.7 15.4 7.7 0.0 11.5 2.77 
MP gets house pass for 
lobbyist to act as research 
assistant whose services 
paid for by external source 
44 24 4 20 4 4 0.0 2.28 
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Table 7. Polarization of views on Corruption Scenarios 
 Very 
corrupt Neutral Not corrupt Polarization 
 1 4 7  [1+7]-4 
Cabinet minister promises appointment 
position exchange for campaign 
contribution 
42.3 7.7 3.8 38.4 
MP using influence to get friend/relative 
admitted to prestigious institution 
40.7 11.1 0.0 29.6 
MP using influence to get friend/relative a 
job 
33.3 3.7 3.7 33.3 
Cabinet minister use influence to obtain 
contract for firm in his constituency 
44.4 11.1 3.7 37 
MP arrange for meetings between private 
corporation executives and 
parliamentarians 
11.1 14.8 33.3 29.6 
MP hires wife or family member to serve 
as his secretary 
40.7 7.4 11.1 44.4 
MP accepts a box of cigars from influential 
constituent 
7.4 29.6 29.6 7.4 
Major company makes big donation to 
government party, eventually won major 
contract 
70.4 0.0 3.7 74.1 
MP exchange 1st class ticket allocated for 
economy class, pockets the difference 
42.3 15.4 11.5 38.4 
MP gets house pass for lobbyist to act as 
research assistant whose services paid for 
by external source 
44 20 0.0 24 
 
Once again, by applying the Pelizzo-Babones index of polarization 12 index to the 
data presented in Table 6, we are able to analyze the polarization of Indonesian 
parliamentarians’ responses towards various corruption scenarios. On close analysis of 
the computations reflected in Table 7, the spectrum of polarization ranges from a 
minimum of about 7 percent to a maximum of about 74 percent. Indeed, the wide range 
                                                 
12 The Polarization Index: [(extreme left + extreme right) – centre], on this index see Pelizzo and Babones 
(2003) as well as Pelizzo and Babones (2006). 
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of parliamentarians’ perceptions and opinions towards these scenarios shows, alarmingly, 
the lack of general consensus among Indonesian MPs on ethical issues. This analysis, 
coupled with our findings presented in Table 5, sustains the claim that Indonesian MPs 
have a multiplicity of ethical standards.  
 If Snape and Skelcher are correct in saying that the success of conduct codes 
depends, among other reason, on whether there are homogenous ethical standards, that 
MP agree on what are the problems that the code should solve, and on what dispositions 
should be put in the code to address those problems, the data that we have presented 
clearly indicate that these conditions are not met in the Indonesian case.  
 
Conclusions 
 
 
The purpose of the paper was to discuss the problems and perspectives concerning the 
adoption of ethics reforms in Indonesia. In doing so, we have argued that while political 
scientists believe that political outcomes are affected by political institutions, they 
indicate that the relationship between institutions and political outcomes is conditional. 
Institutions’ ability to produce a certain outcome depends on a variety of conditions such 
as political will, actors’ constellations, as well as ideational factors.   
Scholars working on legislative and conduct codes have pointed out that this logic 
applies also to conduct codes and ethics reforms. Conduct codes and ethics reforms are 
able to produce the expected results (to curb corrupt, to eliminate misconduct, to promote 
good governance, and so on) provided that certain ideational conditions are met. In this 
respect, Skelcher and Snape (2001) noted that the success of the codes depends on 
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whether the individuals that the code is supposed to regulate have common values, have a 
common understanding of the problems that the code is intended to solve, and have a 
common understanding of what measures can be adopted to fix those problems. 
  Given the high level of perceived corruption in Indonesia and the lack of trust in 
the parliament, Indonesian politicians are doing exactly what they are supposed to do: 
they have tried and they are trying to enact ethics reforms to show their commitment to 
the principles of good governance, to curb corruption and to regain citizens’ trust. In 
order to do so, the DPR adopted an ethics code in 2004 and now both the DPD and the 
DPR are trying to adopt a conduct code to regulate the behavior of their members. This 
obviously represents a step in the right direction. Conduct codes have a greater power to 
regulate the behavior of parliamentarians than ethics codes. Codes of conduct are 
prescriptive rather than aspirational (Stapenhurst and Pelizzo, 2004; Pelizzo and 
Stapenhurst, 2006:195-203; Pasquino and Pelizzo, 2006), as in addition to stating the 
ethical principles and values of the institution, they provide clear guidance to the 
members and establishes sanctions for the violations of the code itself. 
 This said, it is important to keep in mind that the function of a conduct code is not 
to punish wrong-doers, but it is to prevent corruption and other forms of misconduct. 
Hence, ideational factors, such as the fact that MPs have a common value system, are 
more important than sanctions.  
The survey data that we have analyzed and discussed in the paper clearly show 
that the ethical views of Indonesian legislators are not homogenous. There is quite a bit of 
disagreement among Indonesian legislators as to how widespread corruption is, as to 
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what represent corruption and so on. Hence, while discussing the adoption of (and 
adopting) a code of conduct may prove extremely useful to curb corruption, and restore 
citizens’ trust in the Indonesian legislature, it is by itself insufficient.  In drafting the code 
or, better, before drafting the code, Indonesian legislators should discuss what factors are 
responsible for not so good governance, what are the main problems plaguing the 
Indonesian political system, which of these problems can and should be addressed by the 
code, how specific the dispositions of the code should be, and how these dispositions can 
help Indonesia achieve better governance.   
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